Left Hanging: The Crucifix in the Classroom and the Continuing Need for Reform in Italy by Maret, Rebecca E.
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 2 Article 10
5-1-2012
Left Hanging: The Crucifix in the Classroom and
the Continuing Need for Reform in Italy
Rebecca E. Maret
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the European Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston
College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rebecca E. Maret, Left Hanging: The Crucifix in the Classroom and the Continuing Need for Reform in
Italy, 35 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 603 (2012), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol35/iss2/
10
LEFT HANGING: THE CRUCIFIX IN THE 
CLASSROOM AND THE CONTINUING 
NEED FOR REFORM IN ITALY 
Rebecca E. Maret* 
Abstract: Increased immigration throughout Europe and expanding reli-
gious pluralism have exerted pressure on European States to make further 
accommodation for minority religious populations. This poses a challenge 
for Italy and other European States whose national identities are in-
formed, at least in part, by a single religion. A recent decision by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, holding that Italy could refuse parents’ 
requests to remove crucifixes from the walls of public school classrooms, 
has reinvigorated debate throughout Europe on the appropriate place of 
religion in the public arena. This Comment posits that in issuing this opin-
ion, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has 
missed an opportunity to provide meaningful insight into the debate on 
how European States may confront the challenges posed by an increas-
ingly religiously diverse society. As such, European States are left to deter-
mine the policies and parameters of religious accommodation individually. 
Introduction 
 On March 18, 2011, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) issued a judgment in the case of Lautsi v. Italy, 
in which it declared that the display of crucifixes on the walls of public 
school classrooms in Italy did not violate the human rights of its citizens, 
as set forth by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention).1 The decision was delivered in 
stark contrast to the previous ruling issued by the Second Section of the 
ECtHR on November 3, 2009, in which the court unanimously held that 
the public display of crucifixes in Italian public school classrooms did 
amount to a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the 
Convention.2 These successive decisions emerge within an ongoing de-
bate in Europe concerning the appropriate place of religion in the pub-
                                                                                                                      
* Rebecca E. Maret is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Lautsi v. Italy (Lautsi II ), App. No. 30814/06, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 60, 89 (2011). 
2 Lautsi v. Italy (Lautsi I ), App. No. 30814/06, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1051, 1065 (2009). 
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lic arena.3 The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Lautsi will have broad 
implications for that debate, and for the search for an appropriate bal-
ance between States’ interests in preserving the right to forge and main-
tain their own State identities and the rapidly evolving need to accom-
modate an increasingly religiously plural European society.4 
 This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a back-
ground on Lautsi and the reasoning used by the Grand Chamber in re-
versing the Second Section’s decision. Part II discusses how the histori-
cal tradition of Christianity in Italy and throughout Europe has 
informed the European identity, and how the intertwining of these ele-
ments poses a challenge for States under the Convention. Part III ana-
lyzes in greater detail the text of the Grand Chamber’s opinion, with 
particular focus upon the court’s use of the “margin of appreciation” 
doctrine. This section argues that the Grand Chamber failed to contrib-
ute any meaningful insight to the debate on how European States may 
confront the challenges of an increasingly religiously diverse society. 
I. Background 
 At the start of the case, Soile Lautsi, a Finnish-born Italian na-
tional, lived in Italy with her eleven and thirteen year-old sons, Dataico 
and Sami Albertin.5 During the 2001–2002 school year, the boys at-
tended the Istituto comprensivo statale Vittorino da Feltre (Istituto), a State 
public school in Abano Terme, in the province of Padua.6 In each of 
the school’s classrooms, including those rooms in which Ms. Lautsi’s 
children had lessons, a crucifix hung on the wall.7 On April 22, 2002, 
Ms. Lautsi’s husband voiced his concern during a meeting of the 
school’s governors about the crucifixes in his sons’ classrooms, and in-
quired whether they could be removed.8 By a majority vote, the 
school’s governors decided not to remove the crucifixes from the class-
                                                                                                                     
room.9 
 
3 See, e.g., Leonardo Álvarez Álvarez, Education and Pluralism: Towards a Democratic The-
ory of Education in Europe, 6 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 349, 349 (2011) (noting 
that one of the challenges facing modern European states is increasing multiculturalism 
and diversity within their societies). 
4 See Dominic McGoldrick, Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public 
Life—Crucifixes in the Classroom?, 11 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451, 463–64, 475–76 (2011). 
5 See Lautsi v. Italy (Lautsi II ), App. No. 30814/06, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 60, 64 (2011). 
6 See id. 
7 See McGoldrick, supra note 4, at 463–64, 475–76. 
8 See Lautsi II, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 64. 
9 See id. 
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 Ms. Lautsi appealed to the Veneto Administrative Court on July 23, 
2002, complaining that the school’s policy infringed upon her right to 
a secular education for her children under Articles 3 and 19 of the Ital-
ian Constitution, and Article 9 of the Convention.10 The case was dis-
missed on March 17, 2005 after the Administrative Court ruled that the 
presence of crucifixes in public school classrooms did not offend the 
principle of secularism.11 The court suggested that the crucifix could 
be used to reinforce Italian identity in the face of an influx of different 
cultures into Italy, and that “to prevent that meeting from turning into 
 co
by the ECtHR.13 On Novem-
ber avor 
of M
 to uphold confessional neutrality in pub-
al pluralism which is 
                                                                                                                     
a llision it is indispensable to reaffirm our identity, even symboli-
cally.”12 
 After Ms. Lautsi’s appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Italy was defeated, her case was accepted 
3, 2009, the Second Section issued a unanimous judgment in f
s. Lautsi, in which it declared that: 
The State has a duty
lic education, where school attendance is compulsory regard-
less of religion . . . . 
 The Court cannot see how the display in state-school class-
rooms of a symbol that it is reasonable to associate with Ca-
tholicism . . . could serve the education
essential for the preservation of “democratic society” within 
the Convention meaning of that term.14 
The court explained that among the many meanings of the crucifix, 
the religious meaning was predominant.15 Its presence in classrooms 
was therefore capable of both interfering with the Applicant’s right to a 
secular education for her children, and causing an emotional distur-
bance for the students of non-Christian or non-religious backgrounds.16 
 Italy appealed the case to the Grand Chamber, and on March 18, 
2011, the Grand Chamber reversed the Second Section’s ruling, hold-
ing that although “the crucifix is above all a religious symbol,”17 it is “an 
essentially passive symbol . . . [i]t cannot be deemed to have an influ-
 
d. at 65. 
14/06, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1051, 1064 (2009). 
tsi II, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 75. 
10 See id. 
11 See i
12 Id. 
13 See id. at 68. 
14 Lautsi v. Italy (Lautsi I ), App. No. 308
15 See Lau
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 85. 
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ence on pupils comparable to that of didactic speech or participation 
in religious activities.”18 To support its conclusions, the Grand Cham-
ber noted that “there was nothing to suggest that the authorities were 
intolerant of pupils who believed in other religions, were non-believers 
or who held non-religious philosophical convictions.”19 The Grand 
Chamber further explained that in keeping the crucifixes on display in 
the school’s classrooms, the Istituto’s officials acted within the “margin 
of appreciation” afforded to Contracting States to make decisions in 
matters concerning the place accorded to religion within the school 
environment.20 Provided that such decisions “do not lead to a form of 
indoctrination,” the Grand Chamber would find no breach of the re-
quirements of the Conventi
the 
conceptual basis to distinguish itself from the non-Christian world, as 
well as a means by which to foster an internal sense of social unity.26 
                                                                                                                     
on.21 
II. Discussion 
A. The Christian Tradition 
 Europe “is the Bible and the Greeks.”22 Certainly, European his-
tory may be explained, in large part, by Christendom.23 From its roots 
as a Jewish millenarian sect of the Roman Empire, Christianity gained 
momentum after the Edict of Milan, which gave the religion recogni-
tion under the law, thereby allowing it to enjoy “the same toleration as 
other religions.”24 Through the fifteenth century, Europe, as a terri-
tory, was marked by a distinctly Christian identity, in which “the idea of a 
Christian community provided not only a legitimating myth for medie-
val kingship, but also served as a medium of cultural cohesion for 
groups otherwise separated by language and ethnic traditions.”25 In 
effect, Christianity provided the European geographical region with 
 
18 Id. at 87. 
19 Id. at 88. 
20 Id. at 86. 
21 Lautsi II, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86. 
22 Emmanuel Lévinas, The Bible and the Greeks, in In the Time of the Nations 133, 133 
(Michael B. Smith trans., Continuum Int’l Publ’g Grp. 1994) (1988). 
23 See John T.S. Madeley, European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious 
Neutrality, 26 W. Eur. Pol. 1, 8 (2003) (“Europe’s historic association with Christianity is 
itself unambiguous and strong; indeed it is the only part of the old world which has ever 
been integrated on the basis of adherence to a single world religion.”). 
24 Id. at 10. 
25 Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality 33 (1995). 
26 See id. 
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 Italy, in particular, has fashioned a State identity inextricably tied 
to its Catholic heritage.27 With the rise of the Savoy monarchy in 1861, 
Catholicism—the dominant religion throughout the Italian penin-
sula—provided a means by which to unify a country marked by distinct 
territorial regions, languages and cultures, where “the fidelity of the 
new country to ‘its’ religion represented a sort of implicit rule that later 
influenced all Italian history by nourishing a strong rhetoric of continu-
ity.”28 
 As fascism took hold in the country in the early twentieth century, 
the Italian government issued successive royal decrees requiring the 
display of crucifixes in Italian primary and middle school classrooms.29 
By the end of World War II and the arrival of the new Italian Republic, 
however, the principle of religious freedom was enshrined in four pro-
visions of the Italian Constitution.30 Article 7 of the Constitution de-
clares that “[t]he State and the Catholic Church are independent and 
sovereign, each within its own sphere,”31 and Article 8 reads: “All reli-
gious denominations are equally free before the law.”32 Although the 
Italian Constitution guarantees the right of its citizens to religious free-
dom, and though the prior royal decrees requiring the display of cruci-
fixes in public school classrooms have since been rendered void, the 
Italian government maintains the view that keeping crucifixes in public 
school classrooms is “a matter of preserving a centuries-old tradition.”33 
B. The Convention and Europe Today 
 In the wake of World War II, Italy and other European nations be-
came signatories to the Convention, which entered into force in 1953.34 
In an effort to effect greater unity between its members, and to further 
advance the rights recognized in the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the Convention set forth a number of fundamental 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Alessandro Ferrari, Civil Religion in Italy: A “Mission Impossible”?, 41 Geo. Wash. 
Int’l L. Rev. 839, 847–48 (2011). 
28 Id. at 842. 
29 See Lautsi v. Italy (Lautsi II ), App. No. 30814/06, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 60, 70–71 
(2011). 
30 See Const. of the Italian Republic Dec. 27, 1947, arts. 7, 8, 19, 20. 
31 Id. art. 7. 
32 Id. art. 8. 
33 Lautsi II, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 76. 
34 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]. 
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rights and freedoms that would become binding upon its members.35 
Article 2 of Protocol 1 affirms that “[n]o person shall be denied the 
right to education,” and that “the State shall respect the right of parents 
to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions.”36 Article 9 of the Convention 
protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and provides: 
 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private, to manifest his relig-
ion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.37 
 In upholding the freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, mem-
ber nations are free to claim a State religion, or to declare a secularist 
national government as have both France and Turkey; neither posture 
conflicts with the Convention.38 Increased immigration and expanding 
religious pluralism, however, have exerted pressure on Convention 
members to further accommodate religious minorities.39 This poses a 
challenge for Italy and other Convention members whose national 
identity is, at least in part, informed by religion.40 
 In response to this challenge, some Convention members—notably, 
France—have adopted a strict form of secularism, on the view that a 
shared secular space best encourages social unity, transcending the divi-
sions created by the various inheritance narratives claimed by religious 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Rob Lamb, When Human Rights Have Gone Too Far: Religious Tradition and Equality 
in Lautsi v. Italy, 36 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 751, 758 (2011); John Witte, Jr. & Nina-
Louisa Arold, Lift High the Cross?: Contrasting the New European and American Cases on Reli-
gious Symbols on Government Property, 25 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 5, 12–13 (2011). 
36 Convention, supra note 34, protocol 1, art. 2. 
37 Id. art. 9. 
38 See Álvarez, supra note 3, at 373; Grégor Puppinck, Dir., European Ctr. for Law & Jus-
tice, Presentation at the International Law and Religion Symposium: Lautsi v. Italy—The 
Leading Case on Majority Religions in European Secular States, Presentation at the Inter-
national Law and Religion Symposium, 4–5 (Oct. 3–6, 2010). 
39 See McGoldrick, supra note 4, at 457; Andrea Pin, Public Schools, the Italian Crucifix, 
and the European Court of Human Rights: The Italian Separation of Church and State, 25 Emory 
Int’l L. Rev. 95, 140 (2011). 
40 See McGoldrick, supra note 4, at 457; Pin, supra note 39, at 140. 
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groups.41 Under the French system of laïcité, the relegation of religious 
expression to the private sphere of society is regarded as an ideologically 
sound and historically justifiable means to ensure both the freedom of 
religious practice for all French citizens, as well as the preservation of a 
political body free from the influence of any one religious doctrine.42 
Recognizing the freedom that laïcité affords members of society within 
shared, communal public spaces, former French President Jacques Chi-
rac declared that “it is the privileged site for meeting and exchange, 
where people find themselves and can best contribute to the national 
community. It is the neutrality of the public space that permits the 
peaceful coexistence of different religions.”43 
 This form of secularism is one effective means of confronting the 
challenges of an increasingly religiously plural society.44 Such an ap-
proach, however, is less appealing to—indeed, is opposed by—nations 
that have an interest in preserving a national identity steeped in reli-
gious historical tradition.45 Professor Joseph H. H. Weiler, in his oral 
submission to the Grand Chamber on behalf of the third-party inter-
vening States in Lautsi, insisted that: 
[T]he legal imperative of the Convention should not extend 
the justified requirement that the State guarantee negative 
and positive religious freedom, to the unjustified and startling 
proposition that the State divest itself of part of its cultural 
identity simply because the artefacts [sic] of such identity may 
be religious or of religious origin.46 
Though the Italian Constitution declares a separation between Catholic 
Church and State,47 the prevailing “Italian constitutional interpretation 
believes pluralism is enriched by religious culture and thought in public 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Amy Gutmann, Introduction to Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism 3, 5 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1994); Veit Bader, Religious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy?, 27 
Pol. Theory 597, 598 (1999). 
42 See John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves 29 (2007); Britton 
D. Davis, Note, Lifting the Veil: France’s New Crusade, 34 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 117, 122 
(2011). 
43 Bowen, supra note 42, at 29. 
44 See Brian Barry, Culture & Equality 28 (2001). 
45 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, State and Nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue—the Trailer, 8 
Int’l J. Const. L. 157, 163 (2010) (arguing on behalf of the third party intervening States 
before the Grand Chamber that States should be able to maintain religiously informed 
identities as part of their cultural identities). 
46 Id. 
47 Const. of the Italian Republic Dec. 27, 1947, art. 7; see Ferrari, supra note 27, at 
849. 
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institutions such as schools.”48 Indeed, the Government of Italy argued 
in Lautsi that “the presence of crucifixes in classrooms made a legiti-
mate contribution to enabling children to understand the national 
community in which they were expected to integrate,”49 and that remov-
ing these crucifixes “would amount to ‘abuse of a minority position.’”50 
III. Analysis 
 Ruling in Italy’s favor, the Grand Chamber determined that the 
decision to keep crucifixes on the walls of public school classrooms was 
a matter “falling within the margin of appreciation”51 accorded to Con-
tracting States to decide for themselves the place of religion within pub-
lic educational institutions.52 The application in this case of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, namely, the principle that international 
courts should “exercise restraint and flexibility when reviewing the de-
cisions of national authorities,” has been heralded as a triumph of State 
sovereignty.53 Proponents of the decision urge that Italy’s victory reaf-
firms “the freedom of nations/states to include in their self-definition, 
in their self-understanding and in their national and statal symbology, a 
more or less robust entanglement of religion and religious symbols.”54 
On this view, granting Italy a wide margin of appreciation to make deci-
sions on whether to allow crucifixes to hang on the walls of public 
school classrooms “is not unfair given the fact that the Catholic religion 
is the majority religion practiced in Italy, despite the secular nature of 
the Italian State.”55 
 Although the Grand Chamber’s reliance upon the margin of ap-
preciation doctrine may be legally sound, its effect is to perpetuate the 
marginalization of minority religions in Italy.56 Though Italy does not 
formally engage a State religion, Catholicism is, nevertheless, the domi-
nant religion within the State.57 Without careful consideration or adop-
                                                                                                                      
48 Pin, supra note 39, at 100; see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Why Are We Talking About 
Civil Religion Now?: Comments on Civil Religion in Italy: A “Mission Impossible”? by Alessandro 
Ferrari, 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 877, 880 (2011). 
49 Lautsi II, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 77. 
50 Id. 
51 Lautsi v. Italy (Lautsi II ), App. No. 30814/06, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 60, 86 (2011). 
52 See McGoldrick, supra note 4, at 475–76. 
53 Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 
Eur. J. Int’l L. 907, 907, 909–10 (2005). 
54 See Weiler, supra note 45, at 158. 
55 Puppinck, supra note 38, para. 47. 
56 See McGoldrick, supra note 4, at 497. 
57 See Puppinck, supra note 38, para. 47. 
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tion of policies directed at further accommodation of minority religions, 
“[t]he inevitable consequence is that non-dominant traditions . . . will 
not be equally represented or perpetuated in the public reasoning and 
public visual squares.”58 In effect, the Grand Chamber’s holding pro-
vides Italy with an international legal endorsement to maintain a na-
tional identity that inevitably excludes individuals and groups whose his-
torical, religious, or cultural traditions are different from those 
recognized by the State, despite stirrings of discontent from within its 
population.59 
 In its opinion, the Grand Chamber conceded that application of 
the margin of appreciation doctrine is not without limit: the court 
would defer to the decisions of Contracting States “provided that those 
decisions do not lead to a form of indoctrination.”60 The court’s task, 
then, was to determine whether the limit of indoctrination had been 
exceeded.61 The problem with the Grand Chamber’s use, in this case, 
of indoctrination as the limit to the margin of appreciation doctrine is 
that it suggests that only overt acts of indoctrination could satisfy this 
standard.62 Surely, the hanging of crucifixes in public school class-
rooms has the effect, whether direct or indirect, of indoctrinating stu-
dents or compelling those who do not belong to Catholicism to feel 
that they are outsiders within the school environment.63 As long as the 
Italian government maintains, as they did in Lautsi v. Italy, that the sign 
of the cross forms an “identity-linked symbol,” the effect may be to pre-
clude religious minorities from fully participating in educational, civic 
and social life as “Italians” for want of subscribing to the dominant Ital-
ian religious tradition.64 The Grand Chamber’s holding, in acquiescing 
to the margin of appreciation doctrine, effectively propagates a policy 
of non-accommodation in the State’s religiously plural society.65 Given 
the reality of expanding religious diversity within its borders, is the out-
come in Lautsi really Italy’s victory? 
 In relying upon the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Grand 
Chamber failed to contribute any meaningful insight to the debate on 
how European States may confront the challenges of increasing reli-
                                                                                                                      
58 McGoldrick, supra note 4, at 497. 
59 See id. 
60 Lautsi II, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86 (emphasis added). 
61 Id. 
62 See Lamb, supra note 35, at 771. 
63 See Paolo Ronchi, Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and Consensus: The Grand Chamber 
Ruling in Lautsi v. Italy, 13 Ecclesiastical L.J. 287, 294 (2011). 
64 See Lautsi II, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 76. 
65 See McGoldrick, supra note 4, at 497. 
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gious pluralism in diverse society with deep historical roots in Catholi-
cism.66 An alternative approach would have been to encourage further 
reflection by Italy and other European States on how national policies 
aimed at greater accommodation of religious pluralism might better 
serve religious freedom and foster a greater sense of internal unity.67 
Certainly, any specific suggestions made by the Grand Chamber to Italy, 
such as instituting a system of strict secularism like that of French laïcité, 
would likely neither be welcomed by Italy, nor be understood by the 
Grand Chamber as within its ambit to propose.68 Nevertheless, the 
Grand Chamber might have encouraged Italy to enter into an “actual 
dialogue with itself,” and acknowledge the realities of the religious and 
philosophical traditions within its borders “in order to master the nec-
essary pluralism of [its] future.”69 As any such suggestions are absent 
from the Grand Chamber’s analysis, it is left to Italy and other Euro-
pean States, individually, to adopt policy changes aimed at further ac-
commodation of an increasingly religiously plural society.70 Until they 
do, the crosses on the walls and the fate of Italy’s religious minorities 
are all left hanging.71 
Conclusion 
 The decision by the Grand Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy has reinvigo-
rated an ongoing debate throughout Europe on the appropriate place 
of religion in the public sphere. Increased immigration and expanding 
religious pluralism have exerted pressure on Convention members to 
further accommodate minority religious populations within their bor-
ders. This poses a challenge for Italy and other Convention members 
whose national identity is, at least in part, informed by a single religion. 
In relying upon the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Grand 
Chamber’s holding has the effect of perpetuating the unequal repre-
sentation of minority religions and philosophies in Italy. The victory in 
the case offers Italy an international legal endorsement to continue its 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Malcolm D. Evans, From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies Concerning the 
Freedom of Religion and the Freedom of Expression Before the European Court of Human Rights, 26 
J.L. & Religion 345, 345 (2010–2011). 
67 See Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights, 
32 Mich. J. Int’l L. 663, 745 (2011). 
68 See Stefan Sottiaux & Gerhard van der Schyff, Methods of International Human Rights 
Adjudication: Towards a More Structured Decision-Making Process for the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 115, 134 (2008). 
69 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe 83 (2010). 
70 See Lamb, supra note 35, at 770–71. 
71 See id. 
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religious and educational practices, despite stirrings of discontent from 
within its population. In the wake of the Grand Chamber’s holding, any 
trend toward policies of greater accommodation of religious diversity is 
left to European States to adopt individually, within their own margins 
of appreciation. 
